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I. Introduction 
This was a year in which the reviewing courts in California 
were confronted with contemporary problems of constitutional 
law. Teachers were given the right to circulate petitions on 
school campuses during their duty-free time, and the dis-
closure of the names of the officers of organizations granted 
on-campus privileges was required on the ground that the 
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public has a right to know how public officials perform their 
duties. 
"Topless" dancers were given First Amendment protection, 
and the question of whether the dance (and hereafter any 
other matter) is obscene is to be tested by the contemporary 
standards of the entire state. 
The Due Process Clause now protects the "right to bear 
children," but the right is not absolute. The right to wear 
long hair also received protection as a liberty within the Due 
Process Clause. 
A Court of Appeal construed the due process requirement 
of notice and hearing to apply to the assessment of a statu-
tory penalty in cases where a prime contractor violates his 
contract with a public agency. 
In an unusual use tax case, the Court held that a company 
that has stores in Oregon, Nevada, and California need not 
collect a use tax upon credit sales made at the out-of-state 
stores to California residents. Requiring the store to be a tax 
collector in this situation was held to violate the Due Process, 
Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses. 
The Buy California Act was held to be unconstitutional 
as an intrusion of the state into the field of foreign affairs, a 
field reserved to the federal government. Section 1850, of 
the Labor Code, prohibiting employment of aliens on public 
works projects, was found to conflict with a comprehensive 
scheme of immigration and naturalization enacted by Con-
gress. 
In a case illustrating that the courts do not always protect 
the ideals they assert exist under the Constitution, the Court 
of Appeal approved the discharge of a public employee be-
cause his religious beliefs prevented him from taking a loyalty 
oath in the form required by the government, even though 
there was no question as to his loyalty. 
CAL. L.AW 1970 121 
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II. First Amendment 
A. Prohibition of Pretrial Statements 
To what extent may a judge prohibit pretrial statements 
concerning a criminal case pending before him? The defend-
ants in Hamilton v. Municipal Court for Berkeley-Albany 
Judicial Dist.1 had been charged with committing a public 
nuisance and unlawful. occupation of real property; both 
charges grew out of a de~onstration on the Berkeley campus 
of the University of California. 
Prior to the trial, the Court upon its own initiative ordered 
the parties not to release any information concerning the 
triaVI Shortly before the trial, the defendants held a news 
conference in front of the Municipal Court building, in direct 
violation of the court's order. Charged with criminal con-
tempt, the defendants sought a writ of prohibition against 
the county to forestall prosecution. The writ was denied 
and the Superior Court's decision was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeal, with one judge dissenting. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal was of the opinion 
that the order came within the limits of permissible restric-
tions on pretrial pUblicity set forth in Sheppard v. Maxwell.s 
1. 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 168 (1969). Certiorari denied, 
Hamilton et ai, petitioners v. The Mu-
nicipal Court for the Berkeley-Albany 
Judicial District, 90 S. Ct. 479 (1970). 
2. The court's order read: 
"A. The parties shall not, directly or 
indirectly, release to any news media 
information or opinion concerning the 
trial or any issue likely to be involved 
therein, other than the date and place 
of trial, the names of the parties and 
counsel, the contents of the complaint, 
and the plea of defendants. Specifi-
cally, and without limitation, there shall 
be no public statements or releases 
concerning the merits of the complaint, 
the evidence or arguments to be ad-
duced by either side, or trial tactics or 
strategy. B. This order shan apply 
122 
inter alia to the parties and their coun-
sel, to all law enforcement agencies, to 
the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia and their agents and employees 
and to the Associated Students of the 
University of California, their members 
and affiliated organizations. The court 
recognizes the difficulties inherent in 
framing any order in this matter and 
expects the full cooperation of the par-
ties and their counsel in carrying out 
the letter and the spirit of this order. 
The court will entertain motions for 
any further orders that may be neces-
sary or desirable in this matter." 270 
Cal. App.2d 797, 799-800, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
-,169-170. 
3. 384 U.S. 333, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 86 
S.Ct. 1507 (1966). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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In reference to Sheppard, the Court of Appeal stated: 
In Sheppard the court said the trial court in that case 
'. . . might well have proscribed extrajudicial state-
ments by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official 
which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal 
of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any lie 
detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to offi-
cials; the identity of prospective witnesses or their prob-
able testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like 
statements concerning the merits of the case.'4 
The Sheppard case does affirm the power of the Court to 
issue an order concerning news releases prior to a criminal 
trial. It is doubtful, however, that Justice Clark's statement 
therein was intended to determine the limits within which that 
power was to be exercised, particularly when that power col-
lides with the defendant's right of free speech. The Sheppard 
case contained no First Amendment issue. That case con-
cerned the problem of whether too much pUblicity might 
prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.6 
In Hamilton, the defendants were not concerned with the 
effect pretrial pUblicity might have on their right to a fair 
trial. As a matter of fact, just the opposite may have been 
true. The defendants may have been very concerned about 
getting a fair trial if they were to be tried in a vacuum. 
Since the Sheppard case is of doubtful validity as authority 
for the Court's position, it appears that the dissent is on 
sounder ground. As the dissent points out, the order was 
issued on the Court's own motion, and was not supported by 
any affidavits or papers pertaining to a possible danger to 
the judicial process. Close scrutiny, therefore, ought to be 
given to court orders restricting the right to free speech. 
4. 270 Cal. App.2d 797, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 168, 170. 
5. The case of In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 
137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 
( 1968) also involved a court order that 
very broadly prohibited peaceful pick-
eting. The Supreme Court of Cali-
CAL LAW 1970 
fomia struck down the order because 
it was overly broad and thus infringed 
upon a speech-related activity. The in-
stant case involved the exercise of one's 
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In Carroll v. President and Comrs of Princess Anne,6 the 
United States Supreme Court considered an ex parte order 
that restrained certain individuals from holding pretrial public 
rallies or meetings. The Court held that the issuance of the 
ex parte order was impermissible because when basic freedoms 
are at issue both parties must be given an opportunity to be 
heard. The Court recognized that there are circumstances 
in which "speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence 
that it is not protected by the broad guaranty of the First 
Amendment."7 However, the Court also pointed out that: 
Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible in-
terests are adequately served by criminal penalties im-
posed after freedom to speak has been so grossly abused 
that its immunity is breached. The impact and conse-
quences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are 
materially different from those of prior restraint. Prior 
restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom 
which the First Amendment sought to protect against 
abridgment.8 
The court order in Hamilton did precisely what the Supreme 
Court warned against in Carroll. It suppressed speech before 
there was an opportunity for it to come into conflict with 
whatever interests the state may have had in the guaranty 
of a fair trial to the defendants. 
B. N onparticipation in Demonstrations as Conditioning 
Probation 
Another case of prior restraint upon First Amendment 
rights is the case of People v. King. 9 Defendant had been 
found guilty of certain crimes arising out of a public demon-
stration. As a condition of granting probation, the trial 
court ordered "that she not take an active or official part in 
any other demonstrations of this kind during the period of 
6. 393 U.S. 175, 21 L.Ed.2d 325, 89 8. 393 U.S. 175, -, 21 L.Ed.2d 
S.Ct. 347 (1968). 325, -, 89 S.Ct. 347, 351. 
7. 393 U.S. 175, -, 21 L.Ed.2d 325, 9. 267 Cal.App.2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
-, 89 S.Ct. 347, 351. 440 (1968). 
124 CAL. L.AW 1970 
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probation. . . ."lil A short time later, the defendant was 
involved in blowing up balloons on the UCLA campus during 
a peaceful protest against recruiters from Dow Chemical Co. 
As a result, the court revoked defendant's probation and 
sentenced her to 30 days in jail. 
In upholding the revocation, the reviewing court noted that 
there is no right to probation, and that the granting of it is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Whether the 
trial court attaches a condition to the probation is also a dis-
cretionary matter and will not be overturned unless the con-
dition "( 1) has no relationship to the crime of which the 
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct that is not in 
itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct that is 
not reasonably related to future criminality. . . ."11 
Not only was the defendant's conduct, i.e., participation 
in demonstrations, "not in itself criminal," but it is in fact 
constitutionally protected as part of the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment 
In cases of this kind, it should be recognized. at the outset 
that a constitutional right is involved and that constitutional 
rights are to be free of restraint except when a competing 
governmental interest prevails. 
The United States Supreme Court has adopted various tests 
to determine whether the infringement of a right is justified, 
e.g., a clear and present danger test,12 a balancing test,13 and 
a test of overbreadth.14 Many years ago, the Court also 
enunciated a test of "prior restraint.7716 The California Su-
'preme Court recently adopted, in the case of Bagley v. Wash-
ington Township Hospital Dist.,16 a three-part test to be used 
10. 267 Cal. App.2d 814, 818, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 440, 443. 
11. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. 
App.2d 623, 626, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 
293 (1967). 
12. Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 63 L.Ed. 470, 39 S.Ct. 247, 
(1919). 
13. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 
CAL LAW 1970 
U.S. 449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 
1163 (1958). 
14. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 
16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 S.Ct. 1238 (1966). 
15. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 
75 L.Ed. 1357,51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). 
16. 65 Cal.2d 499, 503, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
401, 405, 421 P.2d 409, 413 (1966): 
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as a guide to test governmental restrictions on the exercise 
of constitutional rights. 
The instant case of Miss King and her probation violation 
like a case of prior restraint. As such, it should have been 
tested by the criteria used in those cases. I7 But regardless of 
whether it is tested by the clear and present danger test, the 
balancing test, the overbreadth test, or the Bagley test, the 
important point is that there must first be a recognition that 
a constitutional right is involved. Only then will constitu-
tional rights be accorded the kind of protection the Bill of 
Rights sought to guarantee. 
By approaching the question in this case from the view-
point that probation is a discretionary matter, the Court was 
able to say: 
We cannot hold under the circumstances of this case 
what [sic] the condition of probation in any manner 
abridges defendant's First Amendment freedoms. IS 
C. Campus Buildings: Open to All Speakers or None 
Twenty-three years ago, the Supreme Court of California 
wrote in Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist.:19 
The state is under no duty to make school buildings 
available for public meetings. . . . If it elects to 00 
so, however, it cannot arbitrarily prevent any members 
of the public from holding such meetings. . . . Nor 
can it make the privilege of holding them dependent on 
conditions that would deprive any members of the public 
of their constitutional rights.ao 
which would require a waiver of con-
stitutional rights as a condition of pub-
lic employment must demonstrate: (1) 
that the political restraints rationally re-
late to the enhancement of the public 
service, (2) that the benefits which the 
public gains by the restraints outweigh 
the resulting impairment of constitu-
tional rights, and (3) that no alterna-
tives less subversive of constitutional 
rights are available." 
126 
17. Carroll v. President and Comrs. 
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 21 L. 
Ed.2d 325, 89 S.Ct. 347 (1968). 
18. 267 Cal. App.2d 814, 826, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 440, 448. 
19. 28 Cal.2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885, 
891 (1946). 
20. 28 Cal.2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885, 
891. 
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This statement should have controlled the Superior Court's 
decision in Dunbar v. Governing Board of Grossmont Jr. 
College Dist./ but it did not. The Superior Court upheld the 
college board's denial of a request by a member of the Com-
munist Party to use campus facilities for a speech. The 
Superior Court seemed to be of the opinion that this was 
within the discretion of the board and that the court had no 
right to interfere. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, pointing out that the con-
cept set forth in Danskin controlled this case. 
The Court of Appeal recognized that boards are vested 
with a certain amount of discretion in having guest speakers 
in their educational program, but said that that discretion does 
not extend to unbridled censorship.2 
D. Teachers' Circulation of Petitions During Duty-Free 
Time 
The issue in the case of Los Angeles Teachers Union v. 
Los Angeles City Board of EducationS was whether a school 
board could prohibit teachers from circulating petitions on 
school premises during duty-free time. The California Su-
preme Court unanimously held that such a prohibition was 
unconstitutional in the absence of "substantial disruption of 
or material interference with school activities. "4 
The starting point for an analysis of questions involving 
the constitutional rights of teachers must be: 
Teachers, like others, have the right to speak freely 
and effectively on public questions as well as the 'in-
separable' and 'cognate' 'right to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances' 
They do not 'shed' these rights 'at the school-
house gate'.6 
1. 275 Cal. App. -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
662 (1969). For further discussion of 
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, in this volume. 
2. 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 662, 665 
3. 71 Cal.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 
CAL LAW 1970 
455 P.2d 827 (1969). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Manuel, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW, in this volume. 
4. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
723, 731, 455 P.2d 827, 835. 
5. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
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This properly places the burden squarely upon the govern-
ment to sustain its need to restrict those rights. The govern-
ment did not sustain its burden in this case. 
The Court indicated that it was aware of the ferment and 
turmoil in educational circles today, and of the existence of 
those who are violent and heedless of the rights of others. 
But the Court said that when discouraging persons from 
engaging in wrongful activities, "the courts must take pains 
to assure that the channels of peaceful communication remain 
open and that peaceful activity is fully protected."6 
E. Distribution of Handbills on Private Walk 
The extent to which the First Amendment protects the 
distribution of handbills was the question before the Court 
in In re Lane.7 
Petitioner was an officer of a union that was involved in 
a labor dispute with his employer, the publisher of certain 
newspapers. He went to a market that had advertised in 
one of the employer's newspapers for the purpose of dis-
tributing handbills to the customers urging them not to 
patronize the market. 
The market was set back some distance from the street, 
and the space between it and the street was used for parking. 
Adjacent to the front of the market was a sidewalk, and it 
was on this walk that petitioner was distributing his handbills. 
The owner of the market ordered him off the walk and 
directed him to the walk that ran along the street. When the 
petitioner refused to leave, the police were called and he was 
arrested for remaining on another's property and distributing 
handbills on the premises of another without the consent of 
the owner. Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court, 
but upon bringing a writ of habeas corpus in the California 
Supreme Court, the conviction was reversed and the peti-
tioner discharged. 
6. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 457 P.2d 561 (1969). For further dis-
723, 732, 455 P.2d 827, 836. cussion of this case, see Grodin, LABOR 
7. 71 Cal.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729, RELATIONS, in this volume. 
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The Court likened this case to the recent United States 
Supreme Court case of Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
v. Logan Valley Plaza,s in which the Court upheld the right 
to picket peacefully on the parking lot of a privately-owned 
shopping center. Even prior to the Logan Valley Plaza case, 
the California Supreme Court itself had "declared the exist-
ence of a right to peacefully picket on the sidewalks of a 
privately-owned shopping center."9 
F. Wearing Flag as a Vest as a Criminal Act 
Defendant in People v. Cowgill10 cut up an American flag 
and had it sewn into a vest, which he then wore in public. 
He was tried and convicted of desecrating the flag. On 
appeal, he contended that the statute making it a crime to 
defile the flag was unconstitutional as applied to his actions 
because it violated his constitutional right of free speech. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed, holding the statute constitutional 
and affirming the conviction. 
This case differs from Street v. New York ll because the 
California statute contains no reference to casting contempt 
on the flag by words, as did the New York statute. The 
Court in Cowgill noted that the majority in Street did not 
determine whether a statute as narrowly drawn as the Cal-
ifornia statute could be used to punish someone who had 
"desecrated" a flag while expressing an opinion. The dissents 
in Street, however, argued that such a statute was valid and 
that the government has the power to protect the flag from 
acts of desecration. 
In Cowgill, the Court of Appeal agreed with the dissents 
in Street. There can be no question that this position is 
correct if all that was involved was an act. Laws make cer-
tain acts criminal and, therefore, punishable. The use of 
8. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 88 10. 274 Cal. App.2d -,78 Cal. Rptr. 
S.Ct. 1601 (1968). 853 (1969). Appeal dismissed, Cowgill 
9. Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. v. California, - U.S. -, - L.Ed.2d 
Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Un- -,90 S.Ct. 613 (1970). 
ion, 61 Cal.2d 766, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 11. 394 U.S. 576, 22 L.Ed.2d 572, 
394 P.2d 921 (1964). 89 S.Ct. 1354 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 129 
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the flag as a means of expressing opinion, however, should 
be classified as a speech-related activity. Once it is looked 
upon as having First Amendment characteristics, it deserves 
different treatment. 
The history of decisions concerning speech-related ac-
tivities began in 1877, when the United States Supreme 
Court first said the "distribution" of a newspaper was part 
of freedom of the press. IS Since that time, the Court has 
included many other activities, such as peaceful picketing, 
parading, demonstrating, sitting-in, and soliciting, within the 
classification of speech-related activities. In those cases, the 
Supreme Court has found that the activity itself contains a 
First Amendment characteristic. Thus, the Court has fol-
lowed a pattern of accommodating both the speech factor and 
the need for regulating the activity factor. IS 
The burning or mutilating of a draft card or a flag contains 
no apparent speech factor. Thus, in the case of United States 
v. O'Brien,14 the Court concluded that the act, i.e., the burning 
of a draft card, could be punished as conduct. 
The dissenters in Street took the same position with regard 
to flag-burning-it was punishable as conduct. 
What this approach overlooks, however, is that some "acts" 
that are punishable as such, may actually be a very effective 
method of expressing an opinion. It seems doubtful tha! Mr. 
O'Brien could have expressed his opinion of the draft as 
effectively as he did when he burned his draft card, or that 
Mr. Street could have expressed his concern over the shooting 
of Meredith in Mississippi in any better manner than the one 
he chose, i.e., burning the flag. 
As long as the courts are unwilling to accept the fact that 
some acts do speak "powerfully loud," there will be more cases 
similar to the instant case. 
Burning one's own flag is not the same as burning down a 
12. Re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L. 14. 391 U.S. 367, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 88 
Ed. 877 (1877). S.Ct. 1673 (1968). 
13. Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
1969 p. 256. 
130 CAL LAW 1970 
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schoolhouse, breaking windows, or destroying records. We 
have never had any problem of dealing legally with acts that 
cause evil, nor even with "pure speech" when that speech 
presents a clear and present danger of some substantive evil 
that the government has a right to prevent. 
G. Prima Facie Constitutionality of Obstructing Public 
Passageways Statute 
Defendant was being prosecuted on the charge of commit-
ting a public nuisance by unlawfully obstructing free passage 
and use of a public street. He sought a writ of prohibition on 
the ground that the statute, which characterized unlawful 
obstruction of a public street as a public nuisance, was un-
constitutional in that it restricted the free dissemination of 
ideas. The Superior Court agreed, but the Court of Appeal 
reversed.15 
This statute was attacked as being unconstitutional on its 
face. There was no evidence with regard to what the peti-
tioner had actually done. If one starts from the premise that 
the government does have the power to regulate the use of the 
streets,16 then, provided that the regulation is aimed simply 
at regulating the use thereof, the bare existence of this type 
of statute poses no constitutional issue. In order to be free 
from criminal penalties for violation of such a statute, the 
individual being prosecuted must show that the statute was 
being applied unconstitutionally as to him.17 
The United States Supreme Court has on occasion struck 
down statutes as unconstitutional on their face, but in those 
cases, the statutes, upon examination, infringed some con-
stitutional right. 1s 
15. Pain v. Municipal Court of City 
and County of San Francisco, 268 Cal. 
App.2d 151, 73 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1968). 
16. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 
13 L.Ed.2d 471, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965). 
17. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 
U.S. 111,22 L.Ed.2d 134, 89 S.Ct. 946 
(1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
18. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 
378 U.S. 500, 12 L.Ed.2d 992, 84 S.Ct. 
1659 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
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H. Freedom of Association and the Disclosure of Offi-
cers' Names 
After weighing the interest of the people in knowing how 
their elected officials conduct the public business against the 
First Amendment rights of an individual, the Court of Appeal 
upheld disclosure of the names of the officers of all student 
campus organizations functioning on the Berkeley campus 
of the University of California. In the case of Eisen v. Uni-
versity of California, 19 the Court affirmed a Superior 
Court's refusal to enjoin public inspection of records 
disclosing the names of officers and the stated purposes of all 
student organizations registered by the University. In reach-
ing its decision, the Court concluded that even though there 
were statutes requiring public records to be made available 
to the public, this was a First Amendment case and had to be 
resolved within the framework of court decisions concerning 
First Amendment freedoms. 
In attacking the problem, however, the Court mixed two 
distinct First Amendment concepts, only one of which is ap-
plicable to this case. 
The Court discussed the right of association and the right 
to anonymity as if both were involved here, and as if the 
criteria used to test infringement on those rights were the 
same.20 
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 696, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 45 (1969). 
20. In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 
U.S. 449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 
1163 (1958), the United States Supreme 
Court brought into being a First 
Amendment right of association. In 
that case, the Court wrote: 
"It is beyond debate that freedom to 
engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas is an insepar-
able aspect of the liberty assured by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom 
of speech." 357 U.S. 449 at 460, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1488, 1498, 78 S.Ct. 1163, -. 
In N.A.A.C.P, and in subsequent 
132 
freedom of association cases, the Court 
has used a balancing of interests test to 
determine when the government can 
and when it cannot infringe upon that 
right. When the Court has concluded 
that the interest of the individual is 
greater than that of the government, the 
infringement by way of disclosure has 
not been permitted. Conversely, when 
a majority of the Court was of the opin-
ion that the governmental interest was 
the greater, infringement in the nature 
of disclosure was required. Barenblatt 
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 3 L.Ed. 
2d 1115, 79 S.Ct. 1081 (1959). Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed. 
2d 105, 81 S.Ct. 997 (1961). 
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Eisen is a freedom of association case At issue was not the 
protection of anonymity in order to protect freedom of expres-
sion. Rather the issue was protection against disclosure in 
order to protect an individual with respect to his associations. 
The statute under consideration, on its face, was not aimed 
at a First Amendment right, as was the case of Talley v. Cali-
fornia. I The statute here was nothing more than a public-
policy declaration that public records ought to be open to 
public inspection. Its application to the particular facts of 
this case brought it into conflict with the First Amendment. 
One test that could be used to determine whether the statute 
properly can be applied in a case of this kind is the balancing 
test used in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama.2 
The Court acknowledged as much by stating: 
Impairments of First Amendment rights are 'balanced' 
by determining whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between the impairment and a subject of overriding and 
compelling state interest . . . .3 
This statement, however, is too broad. Not all infringe-
ments on First Amendment rights are solved by the use of the 
balancing test. The Talley case is an indication of that. 
The Court did balance in the Eisen case, and held that the 
public has a compelling interest, but it did not define the 
The right to anonymity really came 
into being in Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, 80 S.Ct. 536 
(1960). In that case the Court had be-
fore it an ordinance that prohibited the 
distribution of handbills that did not 
include information identifying the au-
thor and the person causing the distri-
bution thereof. Of this requirement, 
the Court said: 
"There can be no doubt that such an 
identification requirement would tend to 
restrict freedom to distribute informa-
tion and thereby freedom of expres-
sion." 362 U.S. 60 at 64, 4 L.Ed.2d 
559, 562, 80 S.Ct. 536, -. 
In striking down the ordinance, the 
Court found it objectionable because, 
CAL LAW 1970 
by the overbreadth of its coverage, it 
restricted free expression. No balanc-
ing of interests test was used. Justice 
Black, who wrote the Talley opinion, 
has consistently objected to the Court's 
use of the balancing test. Konigsberg 
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 
105, 81 S.Ct. 997 (1961). See also, 
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Cal Law 
-Trends and Developments, 1969 pp. 
272-274. 
1. 362 U.S. 60, 4 L Ed.2d 559, 80 
S.Ct. 536 (1960). 
2. 357 U.S. 449, 2 L. Ed.2d 1488, 78 
S.Ct. 1163 (1958). 
3. 269 Cal. App.2d 696, 706, 75 Cal. 
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nature of that interest nor state why that interest is greater 
than the petitioner's freedom of association. 
At one point in the opinion the Court says that the public 
interest is the right to know how elected officials conduct the 
public business. Further, in order to determine this "they are 
entitled to know the identity and responsible officers of or-
ganizations that are granted,,4 the right to campus recognition. 
The public does have a valid interest in knowing how public 
officials perform their duties. And it can be argued that one 
way to accommodate this interest is to require disclosure of 
public records, in this case by the disclosure of the identity of 
organizations granted campus privileges. However, in order 
to supply the public with the information it needs to evaluate 
the performance of its public officials, it is not necessary to 
require disclosure of the names of the officers of these or-
ganizations. How the names of the officers are relevant to the 
fulfillment of the public's right to know is obscure. Further-
more, in view of the great amount of public indignation con-
cerning campus disruptions, one wonders how "minimal" the 
infringement on freedom of associations is. 
A better approach to the problem would have been to use 
the test enunciated in Bagley V~ Washington Township Hos-
pital District.5 By paraphrasing that test to apply to the in-
stant case, it would read: 
[W]e hold that a governmental agency which would re-
quire a waiver of constitutional rights as a condition 
. . . [of campus recognition] must demonstrate: ( 1) 
that the political restraints rationally relate to the en-
hancement of the public . . . [interest], (2) that the 
benefits which the public gains by the restraints outweigh 
the resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and (3) 
that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights 
are available.6 
4. 269 Cal. App.2d 696, 703-705, 6. 65 Cal.2d 499, 501-502, 55 Cal. 
75 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50-51. Rptr. 401, 403, 421 P.2d 409, 411. 
5. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 
421 P.2d 409 (1966). 
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The first part of the test seems satisfied by the application 
of the statute in the present case. However, the "impairment 
of constitutional rights" can be entirely avoided by adopting 
the "alternative" requiring that the names and purposes of 
the organizations be made public, but not the names of the 
officers or members. 
I. The Obscenity Problem 
A very important case in the area of obscenity is In re Gian-
nini.7 An entertainer who danced "topless" and the manager 
of the nightclub in which she performed were arrested and 
charged, respectively, with indecent exposure and solicita-
tion of the performance of lewd or dissolute conduct in a 
public place. 
Although the statutes under which the defendants were 
charged did not deal with obscenity as such, the trial court 
instructed the jury that the terms "lewd" and "dissolute" as 
used in the statutes were synonymous with the word "obscene," 
as that term is defined in section 311, of the Penal Code. On 
this point, the California Supreme Court agreed. 
Not being able to cite case authority that a dance was a 
method of expression, the Court turned to encyclopedias for 
assistance and found support there. The Court also noted 
that some courts have held that motion pictures, plays, and 
shows were a form of expression. On that basis, the Court 
concluded that the performance of a dance was a medium of 
expression. A ballet, for example, while entertaining, also 
conveys ideas, impressions, and feelings. 
A dance, then, can be regulated only to the extent that gov-
ernment can regulate other forms of expression. If the dance 
is obscene, it loses its First Amendment protection just as do 
obscene books, pictures, motion pictures, and plays. 
The definition of obscenity has been codified in California 
in Penal Code section 311, as follows: 
Obscene means that to the average person, applying 
7. 69 Cal.2d 563, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 
446 P.2d 535 (1968). 
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contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the 
matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a 
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, 
which goes substantially beyond customary limits of can-
dor in description or representation of such matters and is 
matter which is utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance. 
The full meaning of this statute had not been developed 
prior to this case. Unanswered was whether the test of "con-
temporary standards" applied equally to the phrases "prurient 
interest" and "customary limits of candor." The Court con-
cluded in Giannini that the test of whether the "predominant 
appeal of the [dance] . . . is to prurient interest" should 
be judged by contemporary standards.8 
The Court turned to the case of A Book Named "John 
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Massachusetts,9 wherein three members of the United 
States Supreme Court agreed upon a new test of obscenity 
as follows: 
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, 
three elements must coalesce: it must be established 
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as 
a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the 
material is patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the 
material is utterly without redeeming social value.1Q 
Although it does not appear that this test has been accepted 
by a majority of the Court, the California Supreme Court in 
the instant case referred to part (b) of the test to support its 
decision that the contemporary standards test should also 
apply to determine whether the dance exceeded the "cus-
tomary limi ts of candor." 
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 10. 383 U.S. 413, 418, 16 L.Ed.2d 
476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 1, 5, 86 S.Ct. 975, -. 
(1957). 
9. 383 U.S. 413, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86 
S.Ct. 975 (1966). 
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Having come this far in its analysis of the matter, two ques-
tions remained to be answered: Was it necessary that the 
prosecution introduce evidence of the contemporary stand-
ards? What is the relevant community whose standards are 
to be used to judge the matter-in this case, to judge the 
dance? 
With regard to the first question, the Court found some 
authorities on both sides. Being concerned that jurors might 
use their own personal standards, the Court held that in this 
state, expert testimony would be required to establish the 
standards prevailing in the community. 
To sanction convictions without expert evidence of com-
munity standards encourages the jury to condemn as 
obscene such conduct or material as is personally dis-
tasteful or offensive to the particular juror.ll 
With regard to the question of the extent of the community 
to be used, the Court noted that while there was support in 
the cases for a national standard, a state standard, and a local 
standard, the United States Supreme Court had not established 
any standard by which lower courts were to be bound. 
After weighing the arguments for and against each of the 
standards, the Court held that the community to be surveyed 
in determining contemporary standards would be the entire 
state of California. 
This has one advantage in that the limits of the state are 
established, whereas if a "local" standard were to be used, the 
Court would be confronted with the problem of identifying the 
locality. Furthermore, adopting a local standard would make 
each piece of material distributed nationwide subject to as 
many standards as there are localities. At least the adopting 
of a statewide standard confines the number of possible stand-
ards to 51 (including the District of Columbia) . 
A statewide standard, however, does have one serious 
drawback, for, as the Court points out: "An appellate court 
11. 69 Cal.2d 563, 574, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
655, 663, 446 P.2d 535, 543. 
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must reach an independent decision as to the obscenity of the 
material. "12 
As long as the court that makes the final determination 
in the matter is the highest court of each state, it would appear 
that adopting a state standard is workable from the appellate 
point of view. But obscenity questions do not stop at this 
level. Although there has been no unanimity on the United 
States Supreme Court as to whether that Court is to have the 
last word, several justices have said that the Court must make 
the final decision as to whether the material is in fact ob-
scene.1S And that is what they have been doing. 
The holding of the Giannini case to the effect that the com-
munity standard to be used in obscenity cases is that of the 
entire state, was used by the Court of Appeal in People v. 
Cimber14 to reverse a denial of a motion to quash arrest and 
search warrants. The Court held that at the hearing on the 
motion, the trial court must receive evidence of the standards 
of the entire state, not just those of an isolated area within 
the county. 
Subsequent to In re Giannini, the Court of Appeal had be-
fore it, in the case of Dixon v. Municipal Court of City and 
County of San Francisco,15 the question of whether a simulated 
act of oral copulation within a play could be punished as a 
violation of the Penal Code, which makes it unlawful to 
"engage in lewd or dissolute conduct in any. . place 
open to the public."16 
Recognizing that while there was no statute that expressly 
makes unlawful a play that is obscene, the court nevertheless 
held that the performance of a lewd act within a play may in 
fact be obscene and, thus, illegal. The Court was of the opin-
12. 69 Cal.2d 563, 575, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
655, 664, 446 P.2d 535, 544. 
13. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964); 
A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. 
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 4l3, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86 S.Ct. 
975 (1966); Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 
138 
463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86 S.Ct. 942, 86 S. 
Ct. 969 (1966). 
14. 271 Cal. App.2d 867, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 382 (1969). 
15. 267 Cal. App.2d 789, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 587 (1968). 
16. Penal Code § 647(a). 
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ion that the simulated act of oral copulation, even though it 
took place during the performance of a play, might be found 
to be obscene by the trier of fact applying First Amendment 
standards. 
The Court therefore held that the defendants could be pros-
ecuted and that in judging whether the alleged act is in fact 
obscene, it must be "taken in context with the whole perform-
ance, and judged by standards of the State of California as 
a whole, upon consideration of expert testimony . . . ."17 
J. An Unusual Loyalty Oath Case 
An unusual loyalty oath case was before the Court of Ap-
peal in Smith v. County Engineer of San Diego County.lS The 
petitioner obtained employment as a draftsman in the San 
Diego County Engineering Department in 1965. Upon as-
suming this position, he was asked to sign the loyalty oath re-
quired by the California State Constitution, Art. XX. Section 
3. Before signing, he struck out some of the words. The 
oath that he then signed read as follows: 
I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
support and defend ~ CSHotihltiOfr e£ the United States 
and +l+e ~it-Hf.i.e* e£ the State of California against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true 
faith and allegiance to ~ Ge'irotitlltiOfr e£ the United 
States and +l+e CSHotihltiSll- e£ the State of California. 
19 
It was not until 1967, when the employees were requested 
to execute a new oath, that the petitioner's 1965 oath was 
discovered to have been altered. When he was asked to sign 
an oath in its unaltered form, he refused unless he could 
append a statement to it. This request was refused, and be-
cause he would not sign it in its unaltered form, he was dis-
17. 267 Cal. App.2d 789, 794, 73 19. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 647, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 587, 590. Cal. Rptr. 501, 503. 
18. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 501 (1968). 
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missed. The statement he wished to append to the oath, reads 
as follows: 
I take this oath, pledging my loyalty and allegiance to my 
country, but declaring my supreme allegiance to the Lord 
Jesus Christ whom Almighty God has appointed ruler 
of Nations, and expressing my dissent from the failure of 
the Constitution to recognize Christ and to acknowledge 
the Divine institution of civil government.20 
The petitioner was given a hearing upon his dismissal, but 
the dismissal was upheld. He then sought a writ of mandate 
to compel reinstatement, which was denied by the Superior 
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. 
Justice Lazar, writing for the Court of Appeal, held that 
petitioner had never been a de jure employee of San Diego 
County because of his failure to take the oath in its prescribed 
form; that petitioner was not entitled to sign a valid oath form 
in 1967, when the deficient oath was discovered; and that the 
county was not required to accept the petitioner's proposal to 
sign the oath with the quoted statement attached. 
With regard to the requirement of taking the oath, the Court 
recognized that although public employment is not a right, it 
cannot be conditioned upon any terms that the government 
may attempt to impose, and that the government bears the bur-
den of demonstrating the necessity of any limitation on an em-
ployee's constitutional rights that is a condition to such em-
ployment. 
Also recognized by the Court was the right of the govern-
ment to assure itself of the substantial loyalty of those whose 
services it seeks. 
What makes this an unusual loyalty oath case is that the 
petitioner's loyalty to the United States and the state is not in-
volved. What is involved is whether the petitioner is to be 
required to pledge his loyalty in the form required by the gov-
ernment in order to work for the government, or whether he 
can pledge his loyalty in a manner compatible with his reli-
20. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 647,72 Cal. 
Rptr. 501, 503. 
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gious beliefs. Justice Lazar was of the opinion that only the 
first was acceptable, for he wrote: 
Reason and experience teach us that improvements in 
any institution is brought about in the final analysis by 
those who believe in the institution and if the ideals and 
purpose of constitutional government are to be main-
tained and furthered it will be the result in good part of 
the efforts of personnel who are willing to support those 
ideals and purposes.1 ( emphasis added) 
One of the ideals of this constitutional government is free-
dom of belief. That ideal forbids the government from con-
ditioning government employment upon one's religious be-
liefs.2 Yet that is exactly what the Smith case does. 
The Constitution, which the Court says he must swear to up-
hold, grants him the right to believe and to abide by his be-
liefs when those beliefs and the support and defense of the 
Constitution do not square. It must be kept in mind that this 
is not a case where the government is presently asking the in-
dividual to do any act that is necessary to the defense of the 
Constitutions. In this case, the government is merely seeking 
a pledge that the individual will support these Constitutions 
in the future. The petitioner is willing to agree to do that 
until such time as he may be asked to do something that his 
religious beliefs forbid him to do. When the time comes that 
he is asked to do something in defense of the Constitutions 
and he then refuses to do so, the decision can then be made 
whether the request is one that the government has a right to 
demand. If it does, then his employment can be terminated. 
It is no answer to say that the petitioner can "join those who 
serve themselves in the ranks of private employment."3 As a 
citizen of this country he has as much right to public employ-
ment as does any other citizen. Approaching the problem as 
the Court does in this case places him on an uneven footing 
1. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 650, 72 Cal. U.S. 488, 6 L.Ed.2d 982, 81 S.Ct. 1680 
Rptr. 501, 505. (1961). 
2. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 3. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 652, 72 Cal. 
330 U.S. 75, 100, 91 L.Ed. 754, 67 S.Ct. Rptr. 501, 506. 
556 (1947); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
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with others, not because he is disloyal, not because he is not 
qualified, but simply because he wants to make sure that if he 
is called upon to defend his country, he will not be forced to do 
anything forbidden by his religious beliefs. 
What is disturbing about this approach is that there are cer-
tainly other public employees who have strong religious be-
liefs, who, when asked to do something in defense of the Con-
stitutions, may refuse to do so. When that time occurs, the 
government will have to justify its demand. If its demand is 
justifiable, the employment may be terminated. These people, 
however, simply by signing the oath in its proffered form, be-
come public employees. The petitioner, to be true to his con-
science, wants it on record that he will do the same thing. No 
doubt there are people of the Quaker faith, working for the 
government, who, if called upon to take up arms, might not 
be able to do so because of their religious convictions. Yet 
these people serve as public employees, with no threat to our 
security whatever, simply because they see nothing incom-
patible with taking the oath and the maintenance of their reli-
gious beliefs. 
Twenty years ago, Justice Murphy wrote: 
It is disheartening to find so much that is right in this 
opinion which seems to me so fundamentally wrong.4 
That statement applies to the Smith case. What is right 
in the opinion is '[hat government employment cannot be con-
ditioned upon any terms the government may choose. "When 
[the] government seeks to require a limitation of constitutional 
rights as a condition for public employment, it bears the heavy 
burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for the limita-
tion," and restrictions on cherished freedoms "must be drawn 
with narrow specificity."5 "First Amendment freedoms are 
delicate and vulnerable and must be protected wherever pos-
sible.,,6 
4. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 93 S. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 649, 72 Cal. 
L.Ed. 1782, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949) over- Rptr. 501, 504. 
ruled: 367 U.S. 655, 6 L.Ed.2d 1089, 6. 266 Cal. App.2d 645, 649-650, 72 
81 S.Ct. 1691. Cal. Rptr. 501, 504-505. 
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But what is wrong with the result is that it punishes the pe-
titioner for his religious beliefs without any legitimate reason 
for doing so. The legitimate governmental interest is in hav-
ing loyal employees. There is not one iota of evidence that 
petitioner did not fully meet that qualification. 
The case of In re Summers7 supports the Court's position 
in the Smith case. In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the State of Illinois' refusal to admit an applicant 
to the Bar because his religious beliefs against bearing arms 
prevented his taking an oath to support Constitution. It is this 
writer's opinion that the minority opinion in Summers is a far 
better way to accommodate both the interests of the govern-
ment and those of the individual. As Justice Black wrote for 
the minority in that case: 
Under our Constitution men are punished for what they 
do or fail to do and not for what they think and be-
lieve. Freedom to think, to believe, and to worship, has 
too exalted a position in our country to be penalized on 
such an illusory basis.s 
Yet penalizing Summers and Smith on an "illusory basis" 
is exactly what these two cases do. Results in cases like these 
indicate that our ideals and our practices are not the same. 
K. Fortune-Telling, Marijuana, and the Free Exercise of 
Religion 
Two cases involving alleged governmental infringement up-
on free exercise of religion were before the Court of Appeal 
this past year. In Allinger v. City of Los Angeles,9 after a 
charge of engaging in fortune-telling had been dismissed, the 
Los Angeles Police Department had written petitioner that she 
would be subject to arrest again if she engaged in any further 
fortune-telling activity. 
The petitioner sought declaratory relief to restrain the 
7. 325 U.S. 561, 89 L.Ed. 1795, 65 tieu, Modem Constitutional Law § 1:58, 
S.Ct. 1307 (1945). pp. 89-90. 
8. 325 U.S. 561, 578, 89 L.Ed. 1795, 9. 272 Cal. App.2d 391, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
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police from interfering with her ministry in the Universal 
Church of the Master. She claimed that giving prophecies 
was part of the religious services that she conducted. 
During the trial, however, she admitted that if a fee were 
charged for a prophecy, it would be against the teachings of 
her church. Thus, the Court was able to conclude that 
"fortune-telling for a fee" was not a part of her religion and, 
therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. 
In this case, the petitioner claimed that two sections of the 
Los Angeles City Ordinances were unconstitutional. Section 
43.30, makes fortune-telling illegal. Section 43.31, provides 
that section 43.30, is not to be construed as prohibiting or in-
terfering with the exercise of any religious or spiritual function 
of any bona fide church. The petitioner argued that these sec-
tions granted a monopoly of fortune-telling to religious organi-
zations. To this the Court replied that section 43.31, does not 
purport to permit anyone to engage in fortune-telling, but 
merely states that section 43.30, shall not be construed as in-
terfering with religious services of a church that has as one of 
its tenets a belief in the ability to prophesy. 
In People v. Collins/o it was stipulated that the defendant 
held a good faith belief in the use of marijuana for religious 
purposes. However, he testified that he used marijuana in 
order to extend and intensify his ability to engage in medita-
tive communication with the Supreme Being. The Court thus 
concluded that the defendant did not worship or sanctify mari-
juana as was the case with the use of peyote in Peyotism.ll 
Therefore, there was no interference with a religious belief 
and no First Amendment issue. 
In neither of these cases was the Court presented squarely 
with a Free Exercise issue because the practices involved were 
not part of the religious beliefs of the participants. 
10. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 11. People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716. 
151 (1969). 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). 
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III. Due Process 
A. Bad Moral Character and the Right To Work 
In 1969, Cal Law-Trends and Developments, p. 279, I re~ 
viewed the case of Burton v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles 
Judicial Dist. 12 In that case, the California Supreme Court 
held that the legislative standards used in licensing theatres 
were too broad. Among the standards found overly broad 
was the phrase "good moral character." In the review of that 
case, I pointed out that the phrase "good moral character" was 
a basic standard for licensing a great variety of occupations in 
this state. I then raised the question: If the standard was too 
broad for licensing theatres, why is it not also too broad for 
licensing other occupations? 
The case of Saunders v. City of Los Angeles13 gives one re~ 
viewing court's answer. In this case, the operator of an auto~ 
mobile repair business was denied a renewal license upon var~ 
ious grounds, including a finding of "bad moral character," 
which was a legal ground for disciplinary action. The peti-
tioner sought refuge in the Burton case, contending that the 
ordinance was so indefinite and so vague as to vest the board 
with uncontrolled discretion. The Court of Appeal replied 
that Burton applied only to situations involving the First 
Amendment and therefore was not applicable to a case where 
the renewal of an automobile repair license was at issue. 
As I pointed out in the review of Burton, " To engage in 
an occupation or profession of one's choice is a constitutional 
right. »14 And while it is true that the First Amendment has 
been given a preferred position, this does not justify there be~ 
ing no similar consideration being given to other constitutional 
rights.16 
At stake in First Amendment cases is one's freedom of ex-
12. 68 Cal.2d 684, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 14. Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
441 P.2d 281 (1968). Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
13. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 1969, p. 280. 
236 (1969). For further discussion of 15. McKay, The Preference for Free-
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE dam, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1182 (1959). 
LAW, in this volume. 
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pression, which is a right we highly cherish. But the right to 
work in the occupation of one's choice is also an important 
right and ought also to be protected from "overly broad stand-
ards [which] are fraught with the hazard that an applicant will 
be denied his rights . . . . ,H6 
B. Liberty: The Right To Choose Whether To Bear 
Children 
Although People v. BeiousI7 is a criminal case, involving an 
al1eged violation of Penal Code sections relating to abortions/8 
the case should be discussed from a general constitutional law 
viewpoint because of the following statement made by the 
Court: 
The rights involved in the instant case are the woman's 
rights to life and to choose whether to bear chil-
dren . . . . The fundamental right of the woman to 
choose whether to bear children follows from the Su-
preme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledge-
ment of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related 
to marriage, family, and sex.19 
The Court acknowledges that the right referred to is not 
contained in either the United States or California Constitu-
tions. In support of its statement, however, the Court cites a 
number of cases involving "privacy" and "liberty," none of 
which directly supports the existence of the right as enunciated 
by the Court. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,20 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized a right to procreation when, in com-
menting upon an Oklahoma sterilization statute, it wrote: 
Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which 
is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have 
offspring. I 
16. 68 Ca1.2d 684, 692, 68 Cal. 18. Penal Code §§ 182, 274. 
Rptr. 721, 726, 441 P.2d 281, 286. 19. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
17. 71 Ca1.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 354, 359,458 P.2d 194, 199. 
458 P.2d 194 (1969). Petition for cer- 20. 316 U.S. 535, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 62 
tiorari to the United States Supreme S.Ct. 1110 (1942). 
Court pending. (See Appellate Docket 1. 316 U.S. 535, 536, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 
Case No. 971, filed Dec. 19, 1969. 1657, 62 S.Ct. 1110, -. 
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At another point the Court noted: 
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one 
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race.2 
Even though the right to procreation is considered as one of 
the "basic rights of man," the law does not treat it as absolute. 
Through the use of sterilization statutes, the law completely 
takes away the right prior to conception. Strong arguments 
have been made that compulsory sterilization is a violation of 
due process, in spite of Buck v. Bell,3 which, in 1927, upheld 
a Virginia compulsory sterilization statute. 
The right is not absolute after conception either, because 
by the use of abortion statutes the law requires a woman to 
give birth to the child except when there is a substantial risk 
to her health or where the pregnancy results from rape or in-
cest.4 
Recognizing that the right to bear a child does exist, and 
at the same time concluding that the right is not absolute, 
courts have the problem of determining the extent to which 
the government may be permitted to infringe upon that right. 
In Belous, the Court held that the phrase "necessary to pre-
serve her life" in Penal Code section 274, which makes abor-
tion a crime, was not sufficiently definite to satisfy due process 
requirements. Section 274, therefore, was held to be uncon-
stitutional and the indictment for violation of the statute was 
dismissed. 
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted a new abortion 
law, the key phrase of which permits an abortion when 
"[t]here is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy 
would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the 
mother. "6 It remains to be seen whether the new law will sur-
2. 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 
1660, 62 S.Ct. 111 0, -. 
3. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 71 
L.Ed. 1000, 47 S.Ct. 584 (1927); see 
Comment, Compulsory Eugenic Steri· 
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4. Health & Safety Code § 25951. 
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vive the test of definiteness required by due process when deal-
ing with constitutional rights. 
C. Liberty: Constitutional Protection of Long Hair 
The Court of Appeal equated wearing long hair with the 
right to wear a beard, and concluded that the wearing of long 
hair was entitled to the same protection. The petitioner in 
Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist.6 was suspended from 
attendance at the school because school officials concluded 
that the length of his hair violated the school policy against 
"extremes of hair styles." 
Having concluded that the wearing of long hair was a con-
stitutional right, the court applied the three-part test enun-
ciated in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist.7 The 
Court of Appeal set forth the test in these words: 
. . . the restraint imposed by its regulations must [1] 
rationally relate to the enhancement of the educational 
function, [2] the public benefits produced must out-
weigh the consequent impairment of the student's consti-
tutional rights, and [3] there can be no alternatives 'less 
subversive' of those rights. 8 
The Court found that the first two parts were satisfied by 
the school's regulations concerning hair styles, but that these 
regulations did not meet the third part of the test. There 
were, in the Court's opinion, alternatives "less subversive" to 
the student's right to wear long hair. 
The regulations failed the third part of the test because the 
only criterion used to judge whether the hair was too long was 
the regulation against "extremes of hair styles." This regula-
tion was too vague and uncertain. 
The Court also considered the wearing of long hair as a 
mode of expression under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
6. 269 Cal. App.2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 7. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 
68 (1969). For further discussion of 421 P.2d 409 (1966). 
this case, see Hecht, JUVENILE LAW, in 8. 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 559, 75 Cal. 
this volume. Rptr. 68, 74. 
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ments. In this area, the Court held the "government can reg-
ulate only 'with narrow specificity.' "9 
While the Myers case appears to be in line with Bagley and 
follows the beard cases, the Court does confuse the issue by 
resorting to the First Amendment. The right to wear a beard 
was held to be a due process right of liberty in Finot v. Pasa-
dena City Board of Education.lO The "void for vagueness" 
test is a due process test. And the Court of Appeal recognizes 
this in its citation of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania.ll The reference 
to the First Amendment therefore was unnecessary to the solu-
tion of this case. 
D. Notice and Hearing Prior to Assessment of Penalty 
Section 4110, of the Government Code allows a govern-
mental agency to levy a penalty against a party contracting 
with it when the contracting party has violated certain other 
sections of the code. The penalty in the terms of the statute 
can be 
(1) canceling [the prime contract] or (2) as-
sessing the prime contractor a penalty in an amount not 
more than 10 percent of the amount of the subcontract 
involved . . . , or (3) both canceling and assessing 
the penalty.12 
In Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Los Angeles Uni-
fied School Dist./3 the Court of Appeal held section 4110, un-
constitutional because it did not provide for notice and a hear-
9. 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 559, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 68, 74. 
10. 250 Cal. App.2d 189, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 520 (1967); see Leahy, CONSTITl'-
TIONAL LAW, Cal Law-Trends and De-
velopments 1967, pp. 345-346; Akin 
v. Board of Education of Riverside Uni-
fied School Dist., 262 Cal. App.2d 161, 
68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968). See, Leahy, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Cal Law -
Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 
288-289. 
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S.Ct. 518 (1966). 
12. However, see the 1969 Amend-
ment to § 4110, in Stats. 1969, Ch. 332, 
§ 2, approved one month after the 
Merco case, infra, which deleted subsec-
tion 3 granting the option of both can-
celing the contract and assessing the 
penalty, and added a notice and hearing 
requirement. 
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ing prior to assessment of the penalty, thus denying due proc-
ess of law. The Court wrote: 
We deal with a law which, on its face, gives the award-
ing authority a very wide discretion, but provides no op-
portunity to the party most affected, the contractor, to 
present any facts or arguments on which the exercise of 
that discretion might be predicated. a 
In support of its position, the Court quoted at length from 
People v. Broad/5 to the effect that in the taking of property, 
except in those instances where public health and safety are 
involved (e. g., diseased meat), the owner must be afforded a 
fair opportunity to be heard. 
People v. Broad was a 1932 case involving a forfeiture of 
an automobile used to transport narcotics. There is little 
doubt that in such cases, notice and an opportunity to be heard 
are an essential part of due process.16 
A penalty, however, is not necessarily the same as a for-
feiture, although a forfeiture is a penalty. 
[AJ forfeiture is in its strict sense a divesture of prop-
erty without compensation, in consequence of a default 
or offense.17 
Clearly, a penalty such as is allowed by section 4110, is not 
a taking of property in the usual sense. Nor is it a fine for the 
violation of a penal statute, of which there are many in the 
code.1s If it were penal in nature, the constitutional require-
ments of notice and opportunity to be heard would apply. 
Section 4110 is a legislative declaration that on the breach 
of certain provisions of the code relating to public contracts, 
the governmental agency shall have certain authority, includ-
ing assessing the penalty and canceling the contract. 
14. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 17. See 36 Am. Jur.2d, FORFEITURE 
Rptr. 23, 30. AND PENALTY § 3. 
15. 216 Cal. 1, 12 P.2d 941 (1932). 18. See, for example, Agriculture 
16. Walker v. McLoud, 204 U.S. 302, Code § 54461. 
51 L.Ed. 495, 27 S.Ct. 293 (1907); 
People v. Grant, 52 Cal. App.2d 794, 
127 P.2d 19 (1942). 
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What seemed to bother the Court most was that the agency 
had such a wide discretion in its choice of remedies, and that 
it could secure the amount of the penalty simply by subtracting 
the 10% from the amount payable under the contract to the 
contractor. 
Under the predecessor statute to section 4110, former sec-
tion 4106, a breach of the statutory requirements called for 
a mandatory penalty of a flat 20%, and in addition, the 
agency had the right to terminate the contract. The Court 
did not answer the question whether such a statute would also 
be unconstitutional, were the legislature to return to that type 
of a penalty. 
This case is an unusual application of the due process re-
quirement of notice and hearing. In the usual notice and 
hearing cases, there is some valuable interest at stake and the 
government seeks to take some action to eliminate or infringe 
upon that interest. Whether it can do so depends on the exist-
ence of facts that must be found through the notice and hear-
ing process. Certainly, the payment of money qualifies as a 
valuable interest. The only fact to be found, however, would 
be whether the contractor had violated the terms of the statute. 
It was clear that in the instant case he had. 
Once notice and hearing is granted and it has been estab-
lished that there was a violation for which the penalty should 
be assessed, under due process the matter would be reviewable 
in the courts. But what issues would the court review? The 
amount of the penalty is in the discretion of the agency, as is 
its decision to cancel the contract. Questions of whether the 
contractor had in fact violated the statutes in the performance 
of the contract might be at issue. 
E. Notice and Hearing: Suspension of Outpatient Status 
of Narcotic Addict 
Due process does not require notice and an opportunity to 
be heard when the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority 
(NAEA) suspends the outpatient status of an addict. This 
is the decision of the California Supreme Court in In re 
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Marks. 19 As long as the United States Supreme Court ad-
heres to the view, expressed in Escoe v. Zerbst,20 that "[p]ro-
bation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to 
one convicted of a crime,"l decisions such as In re Marks are 
constitutionally permissible. 
In Marks, the Court indicates that two policies are served 
by revocation of conditional release without a hearing. First, 
the individual is quickly returned to custody, thus eliminating 
the possibility that he would go into hiding or, if a narcotic 
addict, that he would revert to use again. 
While this policy is served by not granting the hearing be-
fore the individual is returned to custody, it is no reason for 
denying a hearing thereafter. Summary suspension of li-
censes, and of the exercise of basic rights, has been allowed 
where either the administrative or judicial process provides 
adequate review. 2 
The second policy served by summary suspension of the out-
patient status is: 
to hold such a hearing every time a release is 
suspended, for whatever cause, would impose an exces-
sive burden on the machinery of the administration of 
justice far outweighing any speculative benefit.3 
While the practical results of constitutional adjudication need 
to be considered, care must be taken that the rights of the in-
dividual are not forfeited simply in the interest of a completely 
efficient system. 
F. Notice and Hearing: in General 
When an administrative officer without notice and hearing 
issues an order that adversely affects a valuable property right, 
19. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 San Diego L. Rev. 35 at 46-49 
453 P.2d 441 (1969). (1969). 
20. 295 U.S. 490, 79 L.Ed. 1566, 55 2. See, for example, Orr v. Superior 
S.Ct. 818 (1935). Court of City & Co. of San Francisco, 
1. 295 U.S. 490, 492, 79 L.Ed. 1566, 71 Cal.2d -,77 Cal. Rptr. 816,454 P. 
1568, 55 S.Ct. 818, -. See also Note, 2d 712 (1969). 
Control and Treatment of Narcotic Ad- 3. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
diets: Civil Commitment in California, 1, 13, 453 P.2d 441, 453. 
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due process requires that the possessor of the right be given 
a full and fair hearing. This was the decision in Alta-Dena 
Dairy v. County of San Diego. 4 
The San Diego County health officer wrote the Alta-Dena 
Dairy that it could not sell raw milk in San Diego County until 
it was free of "pathogenic organisms." The dairy sought re-
lief from the order in an action for writs of mandate, certiorari 
and prohibition. The Court held that the writs of certiorari 
and prohibition would not lie, but that mandamus was the 
correct writ, and that due process required that the dairy be 
given a trial de novo in the Superior Court. 
Although a license in the literal sense was not at issue in 
this case, the principle enunciated in the license cases is ap-
plicable here, i. e., summary action is permitted when judicial 
review is available thereafter. 5 
In Orr v. Superior Court of City & Co. of San Francisco,6 
the Supreme Court affirmed its decision in Escobedo v. State of 
Caiifornia,7 in which the Court had upheld suspension of a 
driver's license under the financial-responsibility law8 without 
a prior hearing as long as there was opportunity to secure a 
judicial review. The Court, in Orr, also held that because the 
statute required the DMV to consider the culpability of the 
driver before ordering compliance with the statute, it was not 
required to determine the constitutionality of a statute that did 
not require the DMV to consider fault. 
In California Grape & Tree Fruit League v. Industrial Wel-
fare Com.,9 after investigating wage conditions in the fruit in-
dustry, the commission set a minimum wage. Among the 
questions raised by the growers' league was what kind of hear-
ing the commission was required to hold prior to making its 
decision. The Court held that because determination of min-
4. 271 Cal. App.2d 66, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
510 (1969). 
5. Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
1969, pp. 290-292. 
6. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 
454 P.2d 712 (1969). 
7. 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950). 
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8. Vehicle Code §§ 16000-16084. 
9. 268 Cal. App.2d 692, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 313 (1969). For further discus-
sion of this case, see Manuel, ADMIN-
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imum wages is a legislative matter, and because this matter 
had been properly delegated to the commission, a judicial type 
of hearing was not necessary. The commission was actually 
acting in a quasi-legislative capacity and, therefore, its proce-
dure was not unconstitutional. 
Due process does not require the establishment of a statu-
tory method of review of administrative action; such was the 
decision in Jones v. Oxnard School District. 10 
If a person is aggrieved by the action of an administrative 
body, the common-law remedies of prohibition and/or man-
damus are available as methods of securing a review of the 
action. 
IV. Equal Protection 
A. Federal and State Constitutions: Equivalent but In-
dependent Protections 
Article 1 of the California Constitution contains two sec-
tions that relate to the concept of equal protection. They are: 
Sec. 11: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uni-
form operation." 
Sec. 21: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever 
be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or re-
pealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen or class 
of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, 
upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion contains an express provision relating to equal protection. 
It reads in part as follows: 
No state shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
In considering the state Constitution together with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court wrote 
10. 270 Cal. App.2d 587, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 836 (I969). For further discus-
154 
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that sections 11 and 21 and the Fourteenth Amendment "pro-
vide generally equivalent but independent protections in their 
respective jurisdictions."l1 
Although it is not always clear whether a court is relying 
on the state or Federal Constitution, the test the court uses to 
determine whether there has been a violation of the equal pro-
tection sections seems to be the same, and gives great latitude 
to the legislature in making classifications. 
In 1942, without distinguishing between the state Constitu-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court of 
California wrote: 
[T]he decision of the Legislature as to what is a suffi-
cient distinction to warrant the classification will not be 
overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary 
and beyond rational doubt erroneous.12 
In Patton v. La Bree/3 the Court added the phrase, "and no 
set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain 
it. "14 
Given these criteria, it was predictable that the legislative 
classifications established by the Winton Act of 1965,15 would 
be upheld against an attack based on sections 11 and 21. The 
act provides for separate treatment of public school system 
employees and employers with respect to employment rela-
tions. Unlike other legislation enacted for the purpose of reg-
ulating the employment relations of public employees, the 
Winton Act requires the formation of a negotiating council 
composed of representatives from rival employee organiza-
tions, where two or more such organizations exist in anyone 
school district. The statute exempted employees of state edu-
cational institutions and noncertificated employees (mainte-
nance personnel, for example) from this requirement. 
11. Department of Mental Hygiene 13. 60 Cal.2d 606, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622, 
v. Kirchner, 62 Cal.2d 586 587, 43 Cal. 387 P.2d 398 (1963). 
Rptr. 329, 330, 400 P.2d 321, 322 14. 60 Cal.2d 606, 608, 35 Cal. Rptr. 
(1965). 622, 624, 387 P.2d 398, 400. 
12. Sacramento Municipal Utilities 15. Ed. Code §§ 13080 et seq.; Govt. 
Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co .. 20 Cal. Code § 3501. 
2d 684, 693, 128 P.2d 529, 534 (1942). 
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The reviewing court in its decision in California Federation 
of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools16 held there was 
no denial of equal protection in thus distinguishing employees 
of public school systems from the general category of public 
agency employees, or in the further distinction between cer-
tificated and noncertificated public school employees. The 
court emphasized the breadth of the legislature's discretion in 
classifying citizens to facilitate the enactment of legislation 
beneficial to the community as a whole. Whether there is a 
denial of equal protection depends in part on the court's esti-
mate of the benefit to be derived by the community from the 
statute. 
In In re Adoption of Runyon/7 the foster parents of an 
agency child urged that the statute denied them equal protec-
tion of the law in preventing them from adopting a child. Re-
jecting this argument, the Court held, without distinguishing 
the state Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
there was a reasonable basis for distinguishing prospective 
adoptive parents from foster parents. The Court cited the 
necessity of preserving the freedom of the agency to determine 
the suitability of a home for the child. The purposes of the 
adopting agencies would be frustrated, the Court said, if per-
sons not approved by the agency as prospective adoptive par-
ents were allowed to file petitions of adoption. 
A municipal ordinance imposing a license tax on the busi-
ness of operating an apartment house was attacked unsuccess-
fully in Clark v. City of San Pablo18 on the grounds that it was 
invalid as a violation of equal protection. For purposes of the 
license tax, the ordinance discriminated between apartment 
houses consisting of 4 or more units, which were subject to 
the tax, and single family, duplex, and triplex rental units, 
which were exempted. To the argument that this distinction 
was arbitrary and violative of equal protection mandates, the 
Court replied that facts reasonably could be conceived that 
16. 272 Cal. App.2d 514, 77 Cal. 18. 270 Cal. App.2d 121, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 497 (1969). Rptr. 726 (1969). 
17. 268 Cal. App.2d 918, 74 Cal. 
Rptr 514 (1969). 
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would sustain it. The Court noted that the size of the opera-
tion, for example, was a valid criterion inasmuch as the city 
council might have recognized that 4 or more units impose 
significantly greater burdens on community resources. As to 
what is arbitrary and discriminatory, the Court held that such 
a determination must depend upon the facts in each case 
". . . and the predilections of the reviewing tribunal as to 
what is arbitrary and discriminatory."19 
At the November 8, 1966, general election, California 
voters ratified a new constitutional provision on legislative 
salaries. The provision validated a 1966 statute increasing 
these salaries, and included an exclusionary clause to prevent 
the higher salary from being used in calculating retirement al-
lowances of legislators retired before 1967, and of their widows. 
In Lyon v. Flournoy,20 the reviewing court declared that the 
widow of a legislator who retired before 1967, was not denied 
equal protection of the law by this exclusionary clause. The 
Court did not identify the source of the equal protection that it 
was alleged the classification violated. The Court noted that 
legislators who served prior to 1967, had paid pension fund 
contributions based on lower salaries, while legislators serving 
thereafter would be required to pay contributions based on 
higher salaries. This fact provided the reasonable basis for 
distinguishing between the two classes. 
Two cases in which the state Supreme Court found a viola-
tion of equal protection are Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization1 and Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State.2 
Both of these cases are discussed hereafter under a different 
section of this review because of other issues decided therein. 
In the Montgomery Ward case, the Court relied on both the 
United States and state Constitutions. In Purdy & Fitzpatrick, 
however, only the Fourteenth Amendment was used. 
19. 270 Cal. App.2d 121, 128, 75 1. 272 Cal. App. 728, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
Cal. Rptr. 726, 730. 373 (1969). Certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 
20. 271 Cal. App.2d 774, 76 Cal. - (1970). 
Rptr. 869 (1969). 2. 71 Cal.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr 77, 456 
P.2d 645 (1969). 
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v. Federal Supremacy 
A. Aliens and Public Works Projects 
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, supra, is a case involving a 
conflict between a state statute and the congressional power 
over immigration and naturalization. The statute in question 
was section 1850, of the Labor Code, which, in general, pro-
hibits employment of aliens on public works projects. 
In determining that the code section was unconstitutional, 
the California Supreme Court noted that the United States 
Supreme Court has voided state laws relating to immigration 
when those laws: 
( 1 ) . . . attempt to regulate or control immigration 
as such . . . (2) [burden] the general congressional 
power to admit aliens . . . ( 3) [w ]hen the Congress 
has enacted a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of 
a particular aspect of immigration and naturaliza-
tion . . .3 
The Court concluded that section 1850, violated (3) 
above, because Congress had enacted a very comprehensive 
scheme of dealing with the admission of aliens who seek to 
enter the labor market in the United States. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found itself con-
fronted with the case of Heim v. McCall/ wherein the United 
States Supreme Court upheld a New York statute almost iden-
tical to section 1850. As the California Supreme Court notes, 
however, Heim did not involve a question of conflict with any 
specific congressional legislation. 
The Court also found that section 1850, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees aliens equal pro-
tection of the law, it was not necessary for the Court to plow 
new ground in holding that the discrimination involved in the 
statute constituted an arbitrary denial of equal protection to 
certain persons merely because of their status as aliens. The 
3. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 4. 239 U.S. 175,60 L.Ed. 206, 36 S. 
82, 456 P.2d 645, 650. Ct. 78 (1915). 
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objective of favoring United States citizens over citizens of 
other countries is inadequate to sustain this discrimination on 
the ground that it promotes a legitimate state interest. Similar-
ly, although the statute allegedly seeks to promote the estab-
lishment of acceptable wages and working conditions in tbe 
contract construction industry, " ... [t]he classification does 
not reasonably relate to the permissible legislative goal of the 
protection of the labor market in the contract construction 
field.,,5 The Court emphasized that it would review strictly 
any state law that classified persons on the basis of alienage.6 
B. Unconstitutionality of California Buy America Act 
Sections 4300-4305, of the Government Code are known 
as the California Buy American Act. This act requires that 
contracts for public works be awarded only to those who agree 
to use materials manufactured in the United States. 
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comrs. of Dept. of 
Water and Power,7 Bethlehem sought to prevent the Depart-
ment of Water and Power of Los Angeles from awarding a 
construction contract to another company who proposed to 
use foreign-made steel. The Court of Appeal in affirming the 
lower court held that the act was unconstitutional because it 
encroached "upon the federal government's exclusive power 
over foreign affairs, and constitutes an undue interference with 
the United States' conduct of foreign relations."8 
Commenting on this legislation, the Court wrote, "The 
present legislation is an impermissible attempt by the state to 
5. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
77, 87, 456 P.2d 645, 655. 
6. This follows from previous Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decisions, 
which the court in the instant case sum-
marizes as follows: 
"In cases involving 'suspect classifica-
tions' or 'fundamental interests' of 
those suffering discrimination, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court prescribes a 
strict standard for reviewing the partic-
ular enactment under the equal protec-
tion clause. Not only must the classifi-
CA L. L.A W 1970 
cation reasonably relate to the purposes 
of the law, but also the state must bear 
the burden of establishing that the class-
ification constitutes a necessary means 
of accomplishing a legitimate state in-
terest, and that the law serves to pro-
mote a compelling state interest." 71 
Cal.2d -, - - -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 
85-86, 456 P.2d 645, 653-654. 
7. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
800 (1969). 
8. 276 Cal. App. 2d -, -, 80 Cal. 
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structure national foreign policy to conform to its own do-
mestic policies.,,9 
VI. Separation of Powers 
There has been a "long established rule that in passing on 
the legality of acts of legislative bodies, the courts cannot in-
quire into the motives behind such acts," according to the 
Court of Appeal in Trujillo v. City of Los Angeles.lO 
The issue arises in cases where a governmental body abol-
ishes a position and discharges the person who held it. This 
was the situation in the Trujillo case. Trujillo had been the 
manager of the city's harbor real estate department. In order 
to terminate his employment, the harbor commissioners en-
acted a plan of reorganization of the department upon the 
stated grounds of economy and efficiency. 
Trujillo sought a writ of mandamus to compel the commis-
sioners to reinstate him, contending that they had acted in bad 
faith. The trial court permitted the introduction of evidence 
as to the motives of the commissioners. The Court of Appeal 
agreed. 
The Court pointed out that the long-established rule is sub-
ject to exceptions: 
Where the law, ordinance or resolution shows on its 
face or in its results an improper purpose, motive or in-
tent, thereby causing damage to a person, courts may 
intervene. 11 
VII. Interstate Commerce 
A. Trains and Dirty Smoke 
Diesel engines emit black smoke when they start moving 
from a standstill position. Because of this, the railroad in 
9. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 800, 805. 
10. 276 Cal. App.2d - -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 149 (1969). In support of 
this statement, the Court cites Stahm v. 
160 
Klein, 179 Cal. App.2d 512, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 137, wherein the question was re-
viewed at some length. 
11. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 149. 
CAL LAW 1970 
42
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/6
Constitntional Law 
People v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company/2 
was charged with a violation of Health and Safety Code 
section 24242, which prohibits contamination of the air. The 
railroad defended on the ground that there was no known way 
to prevent the black smoke when the engine starts from a 
standstill. The Court of Appeal therefore held that the statute 
as applied to the railroad constituted an unreasonable burden 
upon interstate commerce, and that the defendant could not 
be convicted under the clean air statute. 
VIII. State Taxation 
A very thorough analysis of the Due Process, Equal Pro-
tection, and Commerce Clauses as they apply to sales and use 
taxes was made by the Court of Appeal in Montgomery Ward 
& Co. v. State Board of Equalization.13 
The petitioner, Montgomery Ward, operates stores in 
Klamath Falls, Oregon, and Reno, Nevada, as well as in a 
number of cities in California. Many Californians trade at the 
Oregon and Nevada stores making both cash and credit pur-
chases. Because the petitioner maintains stores in California, 
the State Board of Equalization required the petitioner to col-
lect and remit the California use tax on all credit sales made to 
California residents at its stores in Klamath Falls and Reno.14 
The petitioner paid the tax and brought action for a re-
fund. The trial court entered judgment for the petitioner and 
the board appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding 
that requiring the petitioner to collect and remit the use tax 
under the circumstances of this case violated the Due Process, 
Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses. 
All of these clauses have a bearing on the ultimate resolu-
tion of questions of this kind. If a particular tax collides with 
anyone of the clauses, it will fall, even though it may satisfy 
the requirements of the other two. 
12. 268 Cal. App.2d 501, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 222 (1968). 
13. 272 Cal. App.2d 728, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 373 (1969). Certiorari denied, 
90 S.Ct. - (1970). 
CAL LAW 1970 
14. The retailer, under §§ 6203-6204 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, is 
obligated to remit the amount of the 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Constitutional Law 
The Due Process Clause requires "some minimum connec-
tion between a [taxing] state and the person, property or trans-
action it seeks to tax.,,15 
The Commerce Clause requires that state taxes not be, 
(1) discriminatory,16 (2) an undue burden on interstate com-
merce,17 (3) nor be a tax on the privilege of doing business in 
interstate· commerce. IS Although equal protection allows 
classifications in tax laws, they must be neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory.19 
In the instant case, however, the use tax is not a tax on the 
petitioner. It is a tax on the use in California of a product 
purchased in Oregon or Nevada. The petitioner becomes in-
volved because of the requirement that it collect the tax, and 
even if it does not do so, it is required to remit the amount it 
should have collected to California. 
The United States Supreme Court has permitted a state to 
require a vendor who is doing business within the state to col-
lect the use tax on items purchased from the vendor out of 
state: ( 1) when the vendor maintains stores within the tax-
ing state;20 (2) when the orders are solicited by salesmen with-
in the state and sent to the vendor outside the state;l and (3) 
when the vendor does business through independent brokers 
who solicit sales of the vendor's products within the taxing 
state.2 
On the other hand, in the recent case of National Bellas 
Hess v. Department of Revenue,s the Court held that where 
the vendor has no direct contact with the taxing state, it can-
15. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 
347 U.S. 340, 345, 98 L. Ed. 744, 748, 
74 S.Ct. 535, - (1954). 
16. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 
416, 90 L.Ed. 760, 66 S.Ct. 586, 162 
A.L.R. 844 (1946). 
17. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes 
Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 91 L. 
Ed. 993, 67 s.n 815 (1947). 
18. Spector Motor Service v. O'Con-
nor, 340 U.S. 602, 95 L.Ed. 573, 71 
S.Ct. 508 (1951). 
19. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
162 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-528, 3 L. 
Ed.2d 480, 484-485, 79 S.Ct. 437, 
- - - (1959). 
20. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
312 U.S. 359, 85 L.Ed. 888, 61 S.Ct. 
586, 132 A.L.R. 475 (1941). 
1. General Trading Co. v. Tax 
Com., 322 U.S. 335, 88 L.Ed. 1309, 
64 S.Ct. 1028 (1944). 
2. Scripto v. Carson 362 U.S. 207, 
4 L.Ed.2d 660, 80 S.Ct. 619 (1960). 
3. 386 U.S. 753, 18 L.Ed.2d 505, 
87 S.Ct. 1389 (1967). 
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not be made a tax collector even though it does a large volume 
of business with residents thereof through catalog sales. 
In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,4 the Court held that a store 
could not be forced to collect the Maryland use tax where the 
only contact it had with Maryland was the delivery of goods 
into Maryland that had been purchased in Delaware. In this 
case, the Delaware store did solicit Maryland residents by 
radio, newspaper, and direct mail, but the actual purchases 
were made in Delaware. The basis for this decision was that 
it would be a violation of due process to make the Delaware 
store a tax collector under these facts. 
With this background, the Court of Appeal approached the 
instant case, and concluded that insofar as due process was 
concerned, "[s]ince there is no relationship between the re-
tailer's general activities in California, and the generation of 
sales by its border stores, the suggestion that mere presence in 
California is sufficient to authorize a burden on the out-of-
state delivered sales is rejected."5 Therefore, there not being 
any other connection between the out-of-state stores and Cali-
fornia, the rationale of Miller Bros. applies. 
The Court went on, however, to discuss whether this might 
also be a burden on interstate commerce. The Court found 
two objections to making the vendor here the tax collector, on 
Commerce Clause grounds. First, the court noted that inso-
far as the sales were made out-of-state, California gave noth-
ing in return for its asking the vendor to collect the tax, thus 
burdening interstate commerce. Second, during the years for 
which the tax was being assessed, California did not give a 
credit for sales taxes paid out of state. Thus, the taxpayer 
would have been required to pay a sales tax in Nevada plus 
use tax to California. This, the Court believed, would dis-
criminate in favor of California, because potential California 
purchasers would be inclined to buy at home rather than go 
to Nevada and pay both taxes. 
The vendor also raised an equal protection issue by claim-
ing that if it is required to collect the tax, it will be placed in 
4. 347 U.S. 340, 98 L.Ed. 744, 74 5. 272 Cal. App.2d 728, -, 78 Cal. 
S.Ct. 535 (1954). Rptr. 373, 386. 
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a disadvantageous position in relation to its Nevada (and 
Oregon) competitors. Because they have no contact with 
California, they could not be made to collect the California 
use tax. The Court agreed, concluding that since "the use tax 
as administered in this case [imposes] upon the retailer a 
greater burden than is imposed upon those engaged in similar 
business, the retailer has been denied equal protection and 
uniform operation of the law as provided in the United States 
and State Constitutions."s 
6. 272 Cal. App.2d 728, -, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 323, 396. 
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